Can you solve the pirate riddle? - Alex Gendler
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Date: 2020-08-22
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Comments and reviews: 10
arci
I had a counter-thought.
Eliza votes Nay to the 1-coin proposal.
Why?
Because it tells the other pirates that one coin is not enough. This means that if the vote came to Charlotte, Eliza might still hold the power to vote Nay anyway. Bert knows this, and knows that Daniel knows it too.
Whatever happens, either Eliza makes no money, or makes LOTS more than one coin. It's a risk, but a calculated one. Bart's best option is to offer more coins to the other three, much more.
It's a risk, of course, but a logical one.
In my thinking, Bart offers to divide up the coins five ways, he takes two shares, as captain, and the rest each take one share, giving each of the other three 20 coins each, while Bart takes 40.
This hedges the odds closer to being in his favor, knowing that, while the others don't want it to fall to Charlotte, who only needs to offer more than 20 to Eliza to get her vote, and could easily do so with Bart himself out of the picture, but with Charlotte also knowing that, the best way to get Charlotte's vote is to give her enough that she'd be satisfied. Sure, it means Charlotte isn't getting the full booty, but the odds of that happening are fairly slim, she may vote nay anyway, just to be contrary, but better safe than sorry. More importantly, the one who started the trouble making, Eliza, is getting 20 TIMES what she was offered before, and the fact that Daniel is getting ANYTHING AT ALL helps to seal those two precious votes.
It IS still possible for all three of them to vote nay, but the odds of that are slim, and slimmer as Bert offers them more and more. But that brings in different lines of thought and makes the issues even MORE complicated.
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I had a counter-thought.
Eliza votes Nay to the 1-coin proposal.
Why?
Because it tells the other pirates that one coin is not enough. This means that if the vote came to Charlotte, Eliza might still hold the power to vote Nay anyway. Bert knows this, and knows that Daniel knows it too.
Whatever happens, either Eliza makes no money, or makes LOTS more than one coin. It's a risk, but a calculated one. Bart's best option is to offer more coins to the other three, much more.
It's a risk, of course, but a logical one.
In my thinking, Bart offers to divide up the coins five ways, he takes two shares, as captain, and the rest each take one share, giving each of the other three 20 coins each, while Bart takes 40.
This hedges the odds closer to being in his favor, knowing that, while the others don't want it to fall to Charlotte, who only needs to offer more than 20 to Eliza to get her vote, and could easily do so with Bart himself out of the picture, but with Charlotte also knowing that, the best way to get Charlotte's vote is to give her enough that she'd be satisfied. Sure, it means Charlotte isn't getting the full booty, but the odds of that happening are fairly slim, she may vote nay anyway, just to be contrary, but better safe than sorry. More importantly, the one who started the trouble making, Eliza, is getting 20 TIMES what she was offered before, and the fact that Daniel is getting ANYTHING AT ALL helps to seal those two precious votes.
It IS still possible for all three of them to vote nay, but the odds of that are slim, and slimmer as Bert offers them more and more. But that brings in different lines of thought and makes the issues even MORE complicated.
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DairXV
Given pirate contracts are devised for each voyage, the statement that each is an expert in logical deduction falls short. If I were an expert at logic, and considered the contract that would allowed for the possibility for me to get nothing despite all the hard work that goes into crewing a ship, I'd find a different ship with different rules.
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Given pirate contracts are devised for each voyage, the statement that each is an expert in logical deduction falls short. If I were an expert at logic, and considered the contract that would allowed for the possibility for me to get nothing despite all the hard work that goes into crewing a ship, I'd find a different ship with different rules.
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Nick
Would it unreasonable to assume that because they understand each other so well and are perfectly logical, to recognize the imminent outcome it to be able to thwart it? The others all vote no to the first captain and therefore increase the likelihood of maximizing profits between a smaller group?
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Would it unreasonable to assume that because they understand each other so well and are perfectly logical, to recognize the imminent outcome it to be able to thwart it? The others all vote no to the first captain and therefore increase the likelihood of maximizing profits between a smaller group?
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Maarten
I assumed all non-captains were to get the same share but followed the same logic.
With D getting everything on his turn C would have to offer both D and E 1g (keeping 98g.
B then needs to offer the other three 2g each to keep 94g.
So A can offer 3g and keep 88g for himself.
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I assumed all non-captains were to get the same share but followed the same logic.
With D getting everything on his turn C would have to offer both D and E 1g (keeping 98g.
B then needs to offer the other three 2g each to keep 94g.
So A can offer 3g and keep 88g for himself.
reply
Krooma
I solve it, I feel very proud of myself, although I didn't think about it the same way, I just took it straight from Amaro view and put myself in his shoes imagining I'm Amaro and I want to survive because If Amaro didn't die nobody well, I like this riddle
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I solve it, I feel very proud of myself, although I didn't think about it the same way, I just took it straight from Amaro view and put myself in his shoes imagining I'm Amaro and I want to survive because If Amaro didn't die nobody well, I like this riddle
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doqille
last pirate wont agree on 1 coin because she would know that 3rd pirate will propose 1 coin anyway, so first pirate must propose 3 to avoid same ammount with 2nd pirate that will propose to the last ammount of 2 coin.
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last pirate wont agree on 1 coin because she would know that 3rd pirate will propose 1 coin anyway, so first pirate must propose 3 to avoid same ammount with 2nd pirate that will propose to the last ammount of 2 coin.
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Wake
pirate 1: hey look a gold coin over there, pirate 2: arrrrrrrrwww stabded in the back! hoy where yee a pirate lives mayte?
an Arrrrr V. ! ( LOL this people are sick lol)
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pirate 1: hey look a gold coin over there, pirate 2: arrrrrrrrwww stabded in the back! hoy where yee a pirate lives mayte?
an Arrrrr V. ! ( LOL this people are sick lol)
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BigJim
I don't understand this if I was getting one coin in any scenario id vote nay to let me become captain or for next captain to wise up and give a more equal share
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I don't understand this if I was getting one coin in any scenario id vote nay to let me become captain or for next captain to wise up and give a more equal share
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This
Why will any pirate vote 'yar' just to get 1 rupees? If I was the first pirate king, then I would have told, 1st and 2nd pirate gets 33 each and me 34
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Why will any pirate vote 'yar' just to get 1 rupees? If I was the first pirate king, then I would have told, 1st and 2nd pirate gets 33 each and me 34
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Mahmoud
How can they still bribe each other when it is stated clearly in 1: 49 that they are not allowed to use bribery? This riddle is flawed
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How can they still bribe each other when it is stated clearly in 1: 49 that they are not allowed to use bribery? This riddle is flawed
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